CONTENTS OF THE THIRD VOLUME. SECTION VI. ON THE CRITERION OF CERTAINTY. PART I. ON THE CRITERION OF CERTAINTY. CHAPTER I. WHAT IS CERTAINTY, TRUTH, AND PERSUASION 4 CHAPTER II. CERTAINTY CAN NEVER BE BLIND 6 CHAPTER III. OF THE TWO PRINCIPLES OF CERTAINTY 11 CHAPTER IV. OF THE ORDER IN WHICH THE INTRINSIC AND THE EXTRINSIC PRINCIPLES OF CERTAINTY STAND TO EACH OTHER 14 CHAPTER V. OK THE MANNER IN WHICH WE SEE TRUTH 16 CHAPTER VI. THE PRINCIPLE OF KNOWLEDGE MUST ALSO BE THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTAINTY 18 CHAPTER VII. THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTAINTY IS ONE AND THE SAME FOR ALL POSSIBLE PROPOSITIONS 21 CHAPTER VIII. OF A MOST SIMPLE WAY OF REFUTING THE SCEPTICS 23 PART II. APPLICATION OF THE CRITERION TO DEMONSTRATE THE TRUTH OF PURE KNOWLEDGE. CHAPTER I. THE INTUITION OF BEING (THE SOURCE OF ALL CERTAINTY) CARRIES THE PROOF OF IIS TRUTH WITH ITS OWN SELF. ARTICLE PAGE I. Sceptical objections against the intuition of being 30 II. Whence do these sceptical objections originate? 31 III. First sceptical objection: 'Might not the thought of being in general be an illusion?' 34 § 1. Answer to the objection 34 § 2. Sceptical rejoinder 36 § 3. Corollaries of the doctrine just expounded 38 IV. Second sceptical objection: 'How is it possible for anyone to perceive what is different from himself?' 39 § 1. Answer to the second objection 39 § 2. Continuation. — A further explanation is given of the notion of Object 41 § 3. Important Corollaries 42 V. Third sceptical objection: 'Does not our spirit perhaps impart its own forms to the things it sees, and thus alter and transform them from what they really are?' 44 § 1. Answer 44 § 2. Corollaries 46 VI. The refutation of Scepticism is further confirmed 49 VII. What has been thus far expounded is in accordance with Christian tradition 54 CHAPTER II. ON THE IDEA OF BEING IN SO FAR AS IT IS THE MEANS OF KNOWING ALL OTHER THINGS - THAT IS, ON TRUTH I. Connection between the doctrines expounded till now, and those which are to follow 69 II. Divers uses of the word 'truth' 70 § 1. The most general meaning of the word 'truth' 70 § 2. Distinction between 'truth' and things 'true' 70 § 3. Various meanings of the expression, 'the truth of things' 71 § 4. Truth signifies, properly speaking, an idea 72 § 5. What do we mean by the word 'truth,' when we say that truths are many? 74 § 6. What do we mean by truth, when we use this word in the singular and in an absolute sense? 75 III. That the idea of being is truth, is proved by passages from the 'Itinerarium' and from S. Thomas 77 IV. A new demonstration that the idea of being is the truth 80 § 1. The varieties of expression multiply in appearance the species of scepticism 80 § 2. Apparent forms of scepticism 80 § 3. Properly speaking, there can be but one form of scepticism 81 § 4. What the sceptical theory of universal doubt would require in order to be consistent 84 § 5. Scepticism makes thinking an impossibility 86 § 6. The idea of being, and the truth according to which we judge of things, are one and the same 87 CHAPTER III. OF THE USE WHIGH CAN BE MADE OF THE IDEA OF BEING I. The application of the idea of being generates the four first principles of reasoning 88 II. General principle of the application of the idea of being considered in its objective value relatively to the things outside our mind 88 CHAPTER IV. OF THE PERSUASION MEN HA VE CONCERNING BEING OR TRUTH, AND CONCERNING THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF REASONING I. All men feel necessarily persuaded that truth exists, and that the first principles of reasoning must necessarily be true 92 II. The first principles of reasoning are also called 'Common notions' 94 III. What is 4 Common sense? 94 IV. An objection against the universal persuasion of the first principles of reasoning 96 V. Answer to the objection: distinction between direct and reflex knowledge 96 VI. We must be wary in believing those who say that they are not persuaded of the first principles of reasoning 98 VII. The first means for correcting the reflex knowledge of those who deny the first principles of reasoning, is to show them that they are in contradiction with their direct knowledge 99 VIII. The second means for correcting the reflex knowledge of those who deny the first principles, or reason amiss on the most obvious things, is the authority of their fellowmen, which authority may therefore be called a 'criterion of reflex knowledge' 99 PART III. APPLICATION OF THE CRITERION OF CERTAINTY TO DEMONSTRATE THE TRUTH OF MIXED OR MATERIATED KNOWLEDGE. CHAPTER I. OF FACT IN GENERAL. I. Connection of the doctrines we are expounding 102 II. On fact in itself, neither felt nor known 107 III. On fact felt, but not cognised 108 IV. How the matter of knowledge is presented to our spirit 109 V. Universal principle by which the form of human reason is applied to the facts exhibited by feeling 110 VI. Explanations concerning the above universal principle 110 VII. An objection answered 112 CHAPTER II. A FULLER EXPOSITION OF THE PRINCIPLE BY WHICH THE TRUTH OF MATERIATED KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL IS JUSTIFIED.— THE FORMAL PART. I. In what the imperfect state which the innate idea of being holds in the human mind consists 115 II. On similitude 117 III. A further refutation of the fundamental error of the German school 123 CHAPTER III. ON THE CERTAINTY OF THE INTELLECTUAL PERCEPTION, AND FIRST OF ALL OF THAT OF OURSELVES. I. Of the things which fall under our perception 127 II. The feeling we have of ourselves is a substantial feeling 127 III. We perceive ourselves without the aid of any intermediate principle 128 IV. Certainty of the perception of ourselves 129 V. How S. Augustine took the certainty of the perception of ourselves as his starting - point in refuting the Academical philosophers 130 VI. Of other truths which partake of the same certainty as the perception of ourselves 131 VII. A11 observation on the intellectual perceptions of what is felt by the sense 133 CHAPTER IV. ON THE CERTAINTY OF THE INTELLECTUAL PERCEPTION OF EXTERNAL BODIES. I. Difficulty of proving the certainty of the intellectual perception of bodies 134 II. In the passions experienced by our sense, the understanding sees an action 135 III. From the passion suffered by the sense our spirit is led to perceive and know a corporeal substance 136 IV. The validity of the intellectual perception of bodies is demonstrated 138 CHAPTER V. ON THE CERTAINTY OF BEINGS WHICH DO NOT FALL UNDER OUR PERCEPTION BUT ARE INFERRED FROM THOSE WHICH WE PERCEIVE I. What those beings are which we know, not through perception, but through reasoning 141 II. Distinction between the idea of the above beings and the judgment affirmative of their subsistence 141 III. Origin of the ideas of these beings 142 IV. On the judgment concerning the existence of God 142 CHAPTER VI. ON THE KNOWLEDGE OF ESSENCES. I. In what sense we are said to know the essences of things 144 II. How it happened that modern philosophers came to deny that we know the essences of things 146 III. On the truth of known essences in general 147 IV. On the limits affecting our natural knowledge of essences 147 V. Our knowledge of essences has two parts, the one objective and the other subjective 151 VI. Consequences bearing on the nature of our knowledge of essences 154 VII. On the imperfection of our intuition of being 158 VIII. Concerning positive and negative essences 158 IX. On the negative idea of God 161 X. Conclusion 166