This thesis traces the emergence of a new view of the legal subject, one of the subject embedded in social context and relationships, and identifies a turn to a methodology of contextualism in family law and administrative law. It makes this argument using relational theory, a rich strand of feminist political theory. The thesis also uses examples from these legal fields to illustrate relational theory's power and illuminate its problems. Relational theory, in contrast with its understanding of classical liberalism, depends jointly upon a thick description of the subject as contextually embedded and a definition of autonomy as a capacity enabled by constructive relationships. It calls for a focus on relationships and inquiry into what kinds of relationships are desirable. It advocates a contextual method and, normatively, seeks to promote those constructive relationships that enable relational autonomy. Often, however, instead of specifying the kinds of relationship it values, it suggests that conflicts can be resolved simply by thinking contextually about relationships. These elements of relational theory should be separated, as contextualism's useful reach exceeds that of the normative commitment to enhancing relationships. Recent family law shows a praiseworthy turn to a contextual method and normative commitments consistent with relational theory. Administrative law has recently adopted a contextual method. In this domain, however, it is inappropriate to follow relational theory's normative commitments. It is unhelpful to follow relational theory by aiming to enhance bureaucrat-citizen relations as if they were interpersonal relationships. A focus on enhancing relationships cannot transform radically asymmetric relations and can obscure power differentials. More than relational theorists recognize, thick descriptions of the subject and contextualism already pervade these legal fields. Yet even when, as in family law, legal actors fully adopt relational theory's elements, disputes calling for normative decisions persist. In short, many conflicts are irreducible to the contrast between thick, relational and thin, atomistic views of the subject. Instead of reiterating calls for contextualism and thinking about relationships, relational theory should articulate more forcefully its normative commitment to a particular substantive conception of good relationships and offer fine-grained recommendations in contested areas.